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ABstRAct
Can brain drain justify curtailing the right to emigrate? This article 
presents what might be called an “emergency justification” for emigration 
restrictions, one that defends the curtailment of a right as a means to 
prevent a severe cost. The justification presented in this article contrasts 
with the positions taken by Gillian Brock and Michael Blake in their highly 
engaging book Debating Brain Drain. While both authors mention the 
possibility of an emergency justification, neither pays it sufficient attention. 
As a result, both list various conditions for justifying emigration restrictions 
that prove superfluous. This article thus criticizes Brock and Blake for their 
treatment of emigration restrictions. But it also criticizes them for failing 
to condemn the more pressing danger: unjustified immigration restrictions.
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INTRODUCTION
Can brain drain justify curtailing the right to emigrate? This article 
presents what might be called an “emergency justification” for emigration 
restrictions. An emergency justification defends the curtailment of a right 
as a means to prevent a severe cost. Given the importance of the right to 
emigrate in protecting personal liberty, only an emergency justification 
could succeed in justifying counter-brain-drain emigration restrictions. 
An emergency justification, moreover, has a firm basis within international 
1  The article benefited from excellent feedback from Edinburgh University’s Ethics 
Seminar and the workshop on the Ethics of Boundaries at the University of Oslo. I would like 
to thank the respective organizers, Guy Fletcher and Kim Angell.
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law. The emergency justification I shall present contrasts with the positions 
taken by Gillian Brock and Michael Blake in their highly engaging book, 
Debating Brain Drain (2015). While both authors mention the possibility of 
an emergency justification, neither pays it sufficient attention. Understating 
the importance of the emergency justification is thus the first point of 
criticism this article makes of Brock and Blake. The second (closely related) 
point is that they offer an inaccurate list of conditions for justifying 
emigration restrictions. The emergency justification presented here 
involves five conditions: Necessity, Efficacy, Proportionality, Duty to 
Assist, and Duty to Stay. Brock and Blake offer a variety of further conditions, 
all of which prove superfluous. This article will thus sort through the 
possible conditions for justifying emigration restrictions, distinguishing 
the genuine from the fake.
The article starts by offering an account of the moral foundations of the 
right to emigrate (section 1). It then outlines the emergency justification 
for restrictions and the five relevant conditions (sections 2 to 4). Sections 
5-7 turn to Brock and Blake. We find some things to admire but also much 
to disagree with: their misleading framing of the issue (section 5), the 
phantom conditions they impose on emigration restrictions (section 6), 
and their failure to condemn the more pressing danger: immigration 
restrictions (section 7). 
So can emigration restrictions be justified on brain drain grounds? Two 
tasks require separation. First, explicating the conditions under which a 
right may be curtailed. Second, assessing whether those conditions are 
fulfilled in the real world. This article focuses predominantly on the first of 
these tasks. It is only in the final section (section 8), that it turns to the 
second. The view presented there is that the relevant conditions are 
unlikely to be fulfilled. Given current empirical uncertainties, there is no 
compelling case for emigration restrictions to stem the brain drain.
1. THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO 
EMIGRATE 
When assessing the ethics of emigration, it is helpful to start by considering 
the position taken in international law. In law, the human right to emigrate 
comes coupled with the right to free movement. Article 12 of the 
International Covenant on Civil Political Rights (ICCPR) declares:
1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that  
   territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to  
     choose his residence.
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2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own. 
That these rights come coupled together is no accident. The freedom to 
emigrate extends the freedom to move. Foreigners and citizens can move 
freely within the borders of a country (Article 12.1) and leave those borders 
to explore other states (Article 12.2). 
But why do people have these rights? Again, international law offers 
guidance. Among the rights listed in the ICCPR and other human rights 
documents are a set protecting basic liberties. The set, which I shall term 
“human freedom rights”, includes freedom of association, expression, 
religion, occupational choice, and marriage. As a set, human freedom 
rights allow us to make basic life decisions regarding which (if any) religion 
we practice, with whom we associate and communicate, whom (if anyone) 
we marry, and which career we pursue.  These rights entitle us to choose 
among the full range of, what we may call, “life options”: friends, family, 
civic associations, expressive opportunities, jobs, and marriage partners. 
When governments restrict our range of life options —banning us from 
meeting certain people, practicing certain religions, and so on and so forth 
—they risk violating our human freedom rights. Under ordinary 
circumstances, we should be allowed to make basic life decisions without 
government interference. 
The human rights to freedom of movement and to emigrate derive their 
importance from these other human freedom rights. Our range of life 
options depends on our range of physical space. If one is banned from 
moving freely within a country or from leaving a country, then one cannot 
visit friends or family, attend a religious or educational institution, express 
one’s ideas at a meeting or cultural event, seek employment or pursue a 
love affair, in the place one wishes to go. Restrictions on free movement 
and free emigration are, at the same time, restrictions on free association, 
expression, religion, occupational choice, and marriage.  
Since it will prove relevant below, two other rights deserve mention. First, 
consider the right to immigrate. While this right is unrecognized in inter-
national law, the same argument applies. If people are to be free to access 
the full range of life options, then they must be free to enter other coun-
tries. The freedom to emigrate is insufficient to ensure access to exterior 
options if the borders of other states remain closed. Without the freedom to 
immigrate, people are unable to meet, associate, communicate, marry, 
worship, and work with people in those countries. Immigration restrictions, 
no less than emigration restrictions, trespass on the personal domain.2  
2  Clearly much more needs to be said to properly defend the idea of a human right 
to immigrate. I offer an extended defense in other work; see in particular Oberman (2016).
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The second right is the right to stay in one’s own country. Like the rights 
to move, emigrate, and immigrate, the right to stay enables people to 
access life options; in this case, the options available within their home 
country. However, the right to stay is of particular importance. To see this, 
it is worth distinguishing between two kinds of life options: what I term 
“attachments” and “possibilities”. Attachments are those options that a 
person has chosen and now wishes to pursue. Possibilities are those 
options that the person has not chosen, although they may come to choose 
sometime in the future. While our human freedom rights protect our 
ability to access both attachments and possibilities, it is attachments that 
tend to be of greatest significance. It is the freedom to be with our friends 
and family, to practice our religion, to pursue our career, and to be part of 
our community that we cherish the most. The fact that people’s attachments 
tend to be located within their own country lends the right to stay particular 
weight. Important as it is that people are permitted to migrate to other 
countries, it is generally more important that people can remain in their own.
The human right to emigrate exists then because of the role it plays 
within a larger set of human freedom rights. It protects our ability to 
communicate, associate, worship, work, and marry with people living 
abroad. Human freedom rights, as a whole, entitle us to make basic life 
decisions free from government restriction on the options available to us. 
If we are prevented from migrating, our range of life options is significantly 
curtailed.
2. THE EMERGENCY JUSTIFICATION
Is the human right to emigrate absolute? Not according to international 
law.  Article 12.2 of the ICCPR proclaims the right. Article 12.3 immediately 
qualifies it. Restrictions on the human right to emigrate may be justified if 
they “are provided by law” and “necessary to protect national security, 
public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and 
freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in 
the present Covenant”. 
The right to emigrate is not the only right regarded as non-absolute in 
international law. Most of the rights the ICCPR lists are subject to limitations 
or may be derogated from in times of emergency. Interestingly, however, 
there are some rights that are treated as absolute. These include the right 
to life (Article 6), the right not to be tortured (Article 7), and the right not 
to be enslaved (Article 8). 
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I think the position taken in international law is eminently sensible. 
The right to emigrate and other human freedom rights are important, but 
it would be a mistake to insist that they always be respected. Sometimes, 
in emergency situations, human rights can justifiably be curtailed. Thus a 
political demonstration might be justifiably banned, thereby restricting 
freedom of speech, if it would result in widespread rioting. Or people might 
be justifiably subject to quarantine, thereby restricting their freedom of 
movement, to prevent an epidemic. 
International law is also wise to distinguish between different rights. 
While many rights can be overridden, some should be treated as absolute. 
Consider the right not to be tortured. Philosophers and TV shows can 
dream up scenarios involving ticking time bombs and the like in which 
torture seems permissible. But in the real world, such instances are so rare 
and the danger of institutionalizing torture so grave, that it would be a 
mistake to incorporate exemptions into law. Torture marks such a severe 
infraction of a person’s basic interests that it is incomparable to measured 
restrictions of free speech, movement, and other basic liberties. As far as 
the law is concerned, the right not to be tortured should be regarded as 
absolute even though human freedom rights need not.
We have then a possible justification for counter-brain-drain emigration 
restrictions that is compatible with international law. Restrictions might 
be justified because the costs of brain drain are so severe. If, for instance, 
the flight of medical professionals from poor countries leaves needy people 
without care, then that might provide adequate reason for restrictions. 
Public health, after all, is one ground for emigration restrictions that the 
ICCPR explicitly cites. Countenancing restrictions on such occasions does 
not involve denying the existence of a right to emigrate. Rather it involves 
recognizing that the right is sometimes in tension with other human rights, 
such as the right to health. As we saw from the quarantine case, the right to 
health sometimes takes precedence. 
Emigration restrictions cannot be justified, however, unless a series of 
demanding conditions are fulfilled. Three of these conditions apply in the 
case of any non-absolute human right. These I discuss in the next section. 
Two further conditions apply specifically to restrictions on migration for 
the sake of preventing brain drain. These I discuss in section 4.
3. NECESSITY, EFFICACY, PROPORTIONALITY 
There are three standard conditions on the permissibility of human rights 
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curtailment. One finds such conditions stipulated in various places in 
international law, but here I offer my own formulation:
1. Necessity: there must be convincing evidence that the proposed  
    curtailment is necessary to prevent a severe cost.
2. Efficacy: there must be convincing evidence that the proposed  
    curtailment will be effective in preventing the severe cost.
3. Proportionality: the curtailment of the right must be proportionate  
     to the severity of the cost. 
A comment on each. Necessity ensures that human rights are not 
curtailed when reasonable alternative measures are available. A 
government is not justified in banning a demonstration to stop a riot, for 
instance, if enhanced policing would work just as well. This example 
involves a ready alternative, but Necessity can require us to consider 
radical change. Many corrupt and repressive governments may find it 
necessary to curtail rights to prevent severe costs because their corruption 
and repression has caused such harm. On such occasions, the curtailment 
of human rights is, in fact, unnecessary. The governments have a reasonable 
alternative: to end their corruption and repression. This explains, 
incidentally, why the Berlin Wall —the most famous example of an 
emigration restriction —was unnecessary. Given the many failings of the 
GDR regime, the wall may well have been necessary for the maintenance of 
a functioning society in East Germany, but since that regime was itself 
unnecessary, so was the wall. It is no accident that the two fell together. 
Little need be said concerning Efficacy. Clearly, governments cannot 
justify curtailing rights when doing so is ineffective. But notice the phrasing 
of Necessity and Efficacy: “there must be strong evidence”. When 
government seeks to curtail rights to prevent costs, the burden is on 
government to provide the evidence that the proposed curtailment is 
necessary and effective. Restrictions of human rights cannot be justified 
when the empirical case for them is weak. 
Proportionality is separate to both Necessity and Efficacy. Even when 
there are no other means to prevent a severe cost and the proposed 
curtailment is effective, we might still judge it disproportionate. Much will 
depend on the degree to which the right is restricted as well as the severity 
of the cost to be prevented. Rights can be restricted to a greater or lesser 
degree. The complete prohibition of free speech within a country is clearly 
different to a ban on a particular demonstration in a particular city. The 
greater the restriction the less likely it is to prove proportionate.
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4. THE DUTY CONDITIONS
The above three conditions apply in the case of all human rights 
curtailments. There are two conditions, however, which are more specific 
to the brain drain case. To see this, note that counter-brain-drain 
emigration restrictions represent the curtailment of a human right by a 
certain means and for a certain purpose. They operate through the use of 
coercion to try to get one group of people to stay and assist another group 
of people. When one coerces one group of people to try to get them to assist 
another group of people, one must do more than show that the coercion 
used is necessary, effective, and proportionate. One must show that those 
who are being coerced have a duty to do what they are being coerced to do. 
To fail to do this is to come much too close to treating the coerced party 
merely as a means. Each person has her own life to lead. One cannot treat 
people as mere tools to be used in the service of others.3
When applied to the brain drain case, this latest condition on justified 
coercion can be broken down into two parts.
4. Duty to Assist: Skilled workers must have a duty to assist their  
     compatriots. 
5. Duty to Stay: Skilled workers must have a duty to stay in the  
     country to provide the assistance they owe.
Let us consider each of these conditions in turn. Why would skilled 
workers have a duty to assist their poor compatriots? There are at least two 
reasons. First, many skilled workers received their training at government 
expense. They may therefore be obligated to assist their compatriots in 
some way as a form of reciprocation. It would seem wrong to consume 
resources that belong to poor people, knowing that they expect to benefit 
as a result and yet do nothing to help them. Second, there is arguably a 
general duty upon people to help those in need simply because they are in 
need. This duty falls on everyone, skilled workers included.4
A duty to assist does not necessarily translate into a duty to stay. For one 
thing, skilled workers may be able to provide the necessary assistance 
from abroad by way of international transfers. For another, the burdens of 
3  It is worth distinguishing the claim made here from two more ambitious claims. 
First, I am not arguing that coercion can only be applied to enforce a pre-existing duty. The 
concern here is specifically with the use of coercion to force one group of people to assist 
others. Nor am I holding that to coerce people to get them to assist others is, in itself, to treat 
them merely as a means. One does not treat others merely as a means if one enforces a duty 
they owe to others. Here I am at odds with Blake; see section 6.3 below.
4  I develop both these points at greater length in Oberman (2013: 434-9). See also 
sections 6.5 and 6.6 below.
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staying might be unacceptably high. Here, I assume a conception of 
morality under which there are limits to the level of altruistic sacrifice 
people can be asked to bear. It is reasonable for people to refuse to provide 
assistance when doing so involves particular hardship. For this reason, 
skilled workers who are subject to persecution, separated from their family, 
living in dire poverty or working in dangerous conditions do not have a 
duty to stay. It is only when a skilled worker cannot provide sufficient 
assistance from abroad and is enjoying a decent life at home that skilled 
workers have a duty to stay.
Let me sum up. We have seen that the human right to emigrate is 
important since it enables people to pursue life options beyond borders. 
We have also seen that it is non-absolute. Like many other human rights, 
there are occasions in which the potential costs are so high that restrictions 
might be justified.  Restrictions could only be justified, however, if a series 
of demanding conditions has first been satisfied: Necessity, Efficacy, 
Proportionality, Duty to Assist, and Duty to Stay. 
5. CURTAILMENT, FACILITATION, VIOLATION
Central to the above discussion has been the concept of a human rights 
curtailment, so this is worth defining more exactly. When a government 
curtails a right it prevents people from doing something that falls squarely 
within the right’s scope. Rights curtailments constitute a non-trivial 
frustration of the underlying interest or value. A government that curtails 
a right cannot claim that its actions are consistent with the right’s 
fulfillment. The two are in conflict and this must be recognized. The 
curtailment might still be justified, but to justify it, one must point to 
competing considerations of overriding importance. An emergency 
justification seeks to do just that. 
With this in mind, let us turn to Brock and Blake’s treatment of the brain 
drain issue. Both acknowledge the possibility of an emergency justification 
(more on that below). Unfortunately, both tend to muddle the curtailment 
of a human right with other ways rights might be circumscribed. This 
muddling occurs in their eagerness to make emigration restrictions seem 
easier (Brock) or harder (Blake) to justify. 
Brock’s aim is to defend compulsory service programs. Under these 
programs, skilled workers would be required to fulfill some years of service 
before being permitted to emigrate. Brock’s mistake, when defending these 
programs, is to muddle curtailing a human right with facilitating its 
exercise. Thus she compares preventing a skilled worker from emigrating 
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for a number of years with the requirement that people wait their turn 
when exiting a plane or car park (Brock and Blake 2015: 248). One can see 
how such comparisons could work to make compulsory service programs 
seem more attractive. It would be foolish to kick up a fuss about exit queues, 
so perhaps it is foolish to worry too much about temporary emigration 
restrictions. 
But these comparisons fail. One difference is the severity of restriction. 
Being prevented from living where one wishes for a number of years is a 
severe restriction on one’s autonomy. A five-minute wait while the plane or 
car park empties is not. There is another difference however. The 
restrictions in the plane and car park cases represent solutions to 
coordination problems. If everyone attempts to exit a plane or car park at 
once, the result is deadlock. On such occasions, a strong argument for 
intervention is to enable people to better exercise their right to free 
movement. In the emigration case, no similar argument applies. The aim 
of compulsory service programs is not to facilitate emigration but to 
counter the suffering of one group of people by forcing another group to 
stay and assist them. A restriction on the freedom to emigrate that was 
truly analogous to Brock’s cases would be the requirement that when 
people leave a country they queue patiently at the border. A compulsory 
service program is not a form of queuing.
To be fair to Brock, her more general point is that rights to basic liberties 
should not be treated as absolute and that the temporary nature of a 
restriction can aid in its justification. This is correct. But the danger of her 
comparisons is that they make the task of justifying compulsory service 
programs seem much easier than it is. 
Blake’s mistake is to muddle the idea of curtailing a human right with 
violating it. He does this when denying Brock’s claim that the temporary 
nature of compulsory service programs makes them easier to justify. 
Replying to Brock, Blake argues that “[w]e cannot think that the violation 
of a human right is legitimized merely because it is brief” (Brock and Blake 
2015: 291). After all, he reasons, it is unjust to wrongfully incarcerate 
someone for a day, even if it is only a day (Brock and Blake 2015: 290). “A 
temporary violation of human rights is a violation nonetheless” (Brock and 
Blake 2015: 291).
Now it is certainly true that human rights violations remain unjust even 
when temporary. But this point proves much less than Blake thinks. The 
claim that Brock is making is that the brevity of a restriction can help 
justify the curtailment of the right to emigrate; she is not defending the 
violation of the right. A rights violation is unjustified by definition. Once 
we know that the right is violated, matters are clear. The difficult part is 
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discerning the circumstances in which the right to emigrate is violated 
from the circumstances in which it may be justifiably curtailed. And it is 
on the question of justifiable curtailment that the brevity of a restriction 
proves relevant.
As we have seen, the degree to which a right is restricted is an important 
factor in deciding whether Proportionality is fulfilled. A compulsory 
service program that lasts a lifetime is much less likely to be proportionate 
than one that lasts a year. Brevity cannot expunge the injustice of a right’s 
violations, but it can help to show that no human rights violation has 
occurred. This is the fact that Brock emphasizes, but Blake, in failing to 
distinguish violation from curtailment, manages to disregard.
Blake’s failure to distinguish the two concepts is actually symptomatic 
of two wider problems with his part of the book: a tendency to 
mischaracterize international human rights law and to make hyperbolic 
comparisons between emigration restrictions and other forms of coercion. 
Blake styles himself as a defender of “liberal orthodoxy” and the “status 
quo”, a position he identifies with the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) and its inclusion of a right to emigrate (Brock and Blake 
2015: 111-112). Strangely, however, he never mentions the fact that the 
UDHR, like the ICCPR, lists circumstances under which the right to 
emigrate may be justifiably overridden (see UDHR Article 28). Nor does he 
acknowledge the distinction between different kinds of rights. While the 
ICCPR characterizes the right to emigrate as non-absolute, Blake’s favorite 
comparisons are to rights it treats as absolute. To restrict migration is, in 
his view, akin to torture, kidnapping, and slavery (Brock and Blake 2015: 
120-121, 183). It requires people to “sacrifice their own lives in the name of 
others” (Brock and Blake 2015: 169). This hyperbolic language contrasts 
markedly with the orthodoxy that Blake claims to defend. While for Blake, 
it seems, all rights are on par and all restrictions equally egregious, 
international law is careful to distinguish different rights and different 
levels of restriction. 
The result of all this muddling of concepts and misleading comparisons 
is that what should be brought to the fore is pushed to back: the emergency 
justification for emigration restrictions. While Blake and Brock both 
recognize the possibility of a justification of this form, neither offers it 
much space. Brock believes she “can make the central case needed without 
resorting to this line of argument” (Brock and Blake 2015: 285). Her 
eschewal of an emergency justification is in keeping with her misplaced 
identification of compulsory service programs with trivial restrictions to 
solve coordination problems. One need not argue that a rush to leave a 
plane or a car park would cause catastrophe to justify the demand that 
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passengers and drivers wait their turn. If emigration restrictions were a 
form of queuing, an emergency justification would be unnecessary.
Blake says more than Brock regarding emergencies and much of what 
he says makes good sense. He believes an emergency justification can 
succeed given certain conditions and his list includes Necessity and 
Efficacy (Brock and Blake 2015: 211). Still his blunt approach to human 
rights makes the emergency justification seem much more extreme than it 
is. In Blake’s description, it is as if there are two possible worlds: an ordinary 
world, in which human rights law and liberal principles apply, and a brutal 
world, where matters have got so bad that “liberalism’s demands must be 
suspended” (Brock and Blake 2015: 209). In the latter world, no holds are 
barred. Kidnapping of foreign skilled workers is permissible. The right to 
emigrate can be entirely suspended. All moral rights, in fact, are to be set 
aside (Brock and Blake 2015: 210). 
Blake’s characterization of the emergency justification is more dramatic 
than accurate. When we curtail certain rights to prevent severe costs, we 
are not tossing law aside, but drawing on relevant clauses in international 
law. When we place some restrictions on some rights for some period, we 
are not suspending all rights entirely. Indeed, it is telling that Blake does 
not include Proportionality among his list of conditions. Had he done so, 
he may have been encouraged to abandon his all-or-nothing approach to 
human rights and recognize that the brevity of a restriction can aid in its 
justification. 
6. PHANTOM CONDITIONS
I’ve listed five conditions. Blake and Brock list others. To my mind, their 
additional conditions are unnecessary. Let me consider each in turn.
6.1 Legitimacy: Governments can only restrict emigration if they are 
legitimate
Both Brock and Blake are rightly concerned not to license tyrannical 
regimes to further oppress their people. Their solution is the Legitimacy 
condition. On Brock’s definition, a government is legitimate if it comes to 
power through a democratic process, shows a concern for justice, and 
makes good faith efforts to respect human rights (Brock and Blake 2015: 
85-86). 
I sympathize with the motivation behind Brock and Blake’s inclusion of 
Leitimacy but I think it unnecessary. A state that is seriously misgoverned 
is unlikely to fulfill the five conditions outlined above. Corrupt and 
02 Oberman.indd   97 27/4/17   9:07
98 Kieran Oberman 
LEAP 4 (2016)
repressive governments could do much to improve the lives of their citizens 
by embarking upon reforms.  Being corrupt and repressive, they are also 
less likely to make effective use of the skilled workers they retain. (As 
economists often note, “brain waste” is as grave a problem as brain drain.) 
So emigration restrictions imposed by such governments are likely to fail 
both Necessity and Efficacy. They may also fail Duty to Stay. If skilled 
workers are themselves persecuted or living in desperate poverty they are 
morally free to leave. In short, the five conditions I listed offer sufficient 
protection against the misuse of the emergency justification by a tyrannical 
regime.
But is it not possible that at least some illegitimate governments might 
fulfill the five conditions? Yes and this is not a problem. Imagine the 
following scenario. A government fails to hold democratic elections, 
represents a dominant ethnicity, and violates the rights of minorities. The 
government is, nevertheless, reasonably competent and is making great 
strides in eradicating poverty. (Vietnam and China are possible real world 
examples.) Now, suppose the government seeks to impose counter-brain-
drain emigration restrictions against well-off skilled workers from the 
dominant ethnic group. As long as the five conditions are fulfilled, I do not 
think this objectionable. What Blake and Brock refer to under the label of 
legitimacy is, in my view, nothing but a stand in for other concerns.
Note, I am not claiming here that illegitimate governments are 
permissible. Illegitimate governments, being illegitimate, should step 
down. But the question we are asking is not whether illegitimate 
governments should hold power but whether, when they do hold power, 
they perform a further wrong by imposing emigration restrictions. Brock 
and Blake say, “Definitely yes”; I say, “It depends whether the five conditions 
are fulfilled”.
6.2 Contractual Agreements: Only skilled workers who have signed a 
contract can be prevented from leaving
Under Brock’s compulsory service programs, governments would invite 
skilled workers to agree to stay for a number of years in exchange for 
training. Brock stresses this fact in reply to Blake’s objections. Skilled 
workers are not like the victims of kidnapping, as Blake suggests, since 
what they are being forced to do is simply fulfill a contract they consented 
to (Brock and Blake 2015: 253). 
I can see how the existence of a contract can aid in justifying restrictions. 
Emigration restrictions are much more likely to be proportionate if agreed 
to in advance. Nevertheless, there could be occasions, when the costs are 
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particularly high, in which a government could justifiably restrict 
emigration without prior agreement. The idea that human rights 
curtailments always require prior agreement is clearly false. When a 
government bans a demonstration to prevent a riot, it does not require the 
prior agreement of the demonstrators. When a government restricts the 
movements of infected people during an epidemic, it does not require the 
prior agreement of those it quarantines. In short, contractual agreements 
may be a contributory factor in the process of justifying emigration 
restrictions but not a necessary condition.
6.3. Benefiting the Coerced Party: Coercion is not permissible unless it 
benefits those subjected to it
This is an important element in Blake’s critique of compulsory service 
programs. Blake argues that society cannot “coerce the individual except 
when we can, in some specific way, say, ‘We do this for your benefit, and not 
simply that of others’” (Brock and Blake 2015: 205). He associates this 
condition with Rawlsian liberalism and its critique of utilitarianism. A 
utilitarian would permit the coercion of one group of people merely 
because it is useful to others. A Rawlsian, Blake argues, finds this 
unacceptable. Each person has her own life to lead. One cannot treat 
people as mere tools to be used in the service of others.
If Benefiting the Coerced Party were a genuine condition, compulsory 
service requirements would be wrong. These programs are not implemented 
for the sake of the skilled workers themselves but their compatriots. 
Benefiting the Coerced Party is, however, a phantom condition. To see this, 
note that the motivation behind most laws is to benefit people besides the 
coerced party. Laws against rape are not imposed for the sake of rapists but 
their victims. Laws requiring dentists to be qualified are not imposed for 
the sake of dentists but their patients. Laws preventing mining corporations 
from operating on native reservations are not imposed for the sake of the 
corporations but the natives —and so on and so forth. One of the basic 
things we want governments to do is to ensure that other people treat us 
decently, even when —one might say, especially when —it is in their 
interests to treat us otherwise.
Despite leaning on the Benefiting the Coerced Party at various stages, 
Blake himself raises doubts. He notes that something as benign as 
redistributive taxation would seem to violate the condition. His response is 
to argue that redistributive taxation is nevertheless justified because 
wealthy people have their properties and persons protected by their state 
and will go on to benefit in this way into the future. Emigrants, on the other 
hand, will not experience this benefit after emigrating (Brock and Blake 
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2015: 205-207). 
This response involves refashioning the condition in ways that might 
be questioned. But suffice to note here that even with this refashioning, 
Blake is still unable to distinguish redistributive taxation from emigration 
restrictions. For the desired distinction is not, in fact, between wealthy 
taxpayers and emigrants but between wealthy taxpayers and those subject 
to emigration restrictions. While emigrants do not enjoy the protection of 
property and person after leaving, those subject to emigration restrictions 
do not leave. They will thus enjoy the protection of person and property 
into the future no less than wealthy taxpayers. If protection of property 
and person is sufficient to fulfill Blake’s condition in the case of 
redistributive taxation, then that same benefit is sufficient in the case of 
emigration restrictions.
What about Blake’s claim that Benefiting the Coerced Party is entailed 
by Rawlsian liberalism? Here, Blake gets things precisely wrong. Rawlsians 
have no problem with some people being forced to make sacrifices for 
others. That is exactly what Rawls’s two principles of justice require.  It is 
the use of coercion to benefit the coerced party —paternalism —that 
Rawlsians have the most trouble justifying.
Blake is right that we should oppose using people merely as tools for 
others. But this opposition to mere using need not require us to adopt 
Benefiting the Coerced Party. Consider three purposes to which coercion 
may be applied against party A:
(1) To use A as a means to benefit some other party, B.
(2) To enforce moral duties that A owes B.
(3) To benefit A.
Blake is right to find (1) troubling. Where he errs is in assuming coercion 
can therefore only be justified when purpose (3) is (also) being pursued. 
The possibility of (2) seems to have escaped him. While coercing people 
merely because it benefits others is rarely justified, enforcing people’s 
moral duties to others is the bread and butter of the law. In short, the 
solution to the concern that compulsory service programs involve mere 
using is not Benefitting the Coerced Party but the two duty conditions 
outlined above: Duty to Assist and Duty to Stay.
6.4 Compensation: One cannot curtail someone’s human rights 
without compensation
This is another of Blake’s conditions; one that he believes it is difficult to 
fulfill. He wonders whether “we will ever be in a position to adequately 
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compensate … the prevented emigrant for what we have done to them” 
(Brock and Blake 2015: 211).
But no such condition applies. The idea that human rights curtailments 
require compensation seems reasonable when copious resources are 
available. But in the brain drain case, resources are scarce. We know this 
because any country that is justified in imposing emigration restrictions 
fulfills Necessity: it lacks the funds to raise salaries, improve working 
conditions, or pursue any other non-coercive solution to the brain drain 
problem. Given this lack of resources, it will often be unreasonable to 
expect poor countries to use limited funds for compensation. 
The stance taken here applies to other human rights curtailments. If a 
poor country is trying to cope with an epidemic, it may be justified in 
quarantining. Ideally, those quarantined would be compensated, but it 
would be a mistake to insist that compensation always be dispensed. In a 
poor country, every penny that is spent on compensation could be spent 
on meeting more urgent needs.5  
The stance also fits the logic of emergency justifications. In recognizing 
the possibility of emergency justifications, we acknowledge that sometimes 
a person’s rights may be curtailed to prevent a severe cost. In rejecting 
Compensation, we likewise acknowledge that sometimes a person’s claim 
for compensation can be overridden to prevent a severe cost. If a person’s 
human freedom rights are not absolute, there seems no reason to treat 
their claim to compensation as such. Blake’s combination of an emergency 
justification with Compensation is morally contradictory.
6.5 Fairness: No one should be forced to provide more than her fair 
share of assistance
I have claimed that everyone is obliged to assist the global poor. If we take 
this point seriously, we must radically re-conceptualize the brain drain 
problem. In rich countries, brain drain is not an acute problem. They have 
the resources to train and retain skilled workers. Now, the world as a whole 
is a rich place. Were resources to be shared out globally, there is no reason 
why sufficient numbers of skilled workers could not be trained and retained 
to run adequate public services for everybody everywhere. From this 
perspective, brain drain does not represent a migration problem but a 
problem of global inequality.
5  Recall, once more, that we are discussing here compensation for the curtailment 
of a human right. The case for compensation when a human right is violated might be 
stronger. This is another place in which the distinction between curtailment and violation 
proves important. 
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Anticipating a view of this kind, Blake asks how it can be fair to force 
skilled workers from poor countries to stay and assist their compatriots. Is 
this not forcing one group of people to make up for the unfairness of others? 
Is that not unjust (Brock and Blake 2015:169-173)? The correct answer, to 
my mind, is yes, counter-brain-drain emigration restrictions involve 
forcing skilled workers to make an unfairly large contribution, but no, this 
does not make restrictions unjust.
Governments routinely force people to bear unfair costs. Consider the 
criminal justice system. If it is unfair to fail to pay one’s share of the costs 
of meeting some need, then it is also unfair to unjustly create a need that 
others must meet. This is what criminals do. In a perfectly just society, 
there would be no crime, so there would be no need for the police, the 
courts, and the prison service. Criminals unfairly create this need. 
Nevertheless, it is much better that governments force citizens to bear the 
costs of criminal justice, than leave people unprotected.6
Indeed, talk of unfairness in such cases can itself be misleading for 
there are actually two forms of unfairness here. There is the unfairness of 
forcing some to correct for the failings of others (the unfairness Blake 
highlights) and there is the unfairness that would result were nothing done 
(an unfairness Blake neglects). In both cases, people suffer due to the 
failings of others. Where the difference lies is in who suffers and by how 
much. Unfair as it may be if skilled workers are forced to stay, a world in 
which the poorest people lack basic services is the least fair of all.
6.6 Coercing Foreigners: Poor country skilled workers cannot be forced 
to stay unless rich country skilled workers can be forced to migrate
The cosmopolitan view just outlined entails that skilled workers in rich 
countries have as significant duties towards the global poor as skilled 
workers in poor countries.  But this view generates what might be called 
the “foreign worker problem”. If emigration restrictions forcing skilled 
workers from poor countries to stay were permissible, why would it not be 
permissible to force skilled workers in rich countries to migrate to poor 
countries to apply their skills? For many, this forced migration proposal 
will seem intuitively objectionable. But if it is objectionable, must we not 
also condemn emigration restrictions?
Blake raises the foreign worker problem using the example of a foreign 
6  In response, Blake might try to distinguish between costs that have been unfairly 
created (the criminal justice case) and costs that have been unfairly shirked (the brain drain 
case) and argue that governments are permitted to force third parties to bear the former but 
not the latter. But the problem with this response is that there seems no relevant moral 
distinction between shirking and creating to be found here (see Murphy 2000: 124-126).
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worker kidnapped by poor state’s government (Brock and Blake 2015:130). 
Like Brock, I find this analogy unhelpful (Brock and Blake 2015: 253-254). 
It suggests the sudden capture and confinement of a person, by a foreign 
state, without legal oversight. To my mind a much better analogy would be 
this: rich countries pass a law that enables the conscription of their own 
skilled workers into a program that sends them to poor countries to fulfill 
some period of service. This is not kidnapping but it is controversial, so the 
foreign worker problem remains.
Two responses. First, I do not think we can deny the possibility that 
forced migration might, in some extreme occasions, be justified. Not even 
Blake denies it. He accepts that global poverty constitutes an ethical 
emergency and that emergencies call for extraordinary measures. His 
claim is that emigration restrictions cannot be justified except when forced 
migration is justified: the Coercing Foreigners condition. If the conscription 
proposal still sounds radical this is because cosmopolitanism is radical. 
The dominant view has long been that people are obliged to make 
significant sacrifices only for their own compatriots. Cosmopolitanism 
challenges this view. We should not be surprised if a radical approach to 
global ethics has some surprising implications when applied to real world 
problems.
Second, Coercing Foreigners is a phantom condition. It is, in fact, much 
harder to justify forced migration than emigration restrictions even 
assuming a cosmopolitan perspective. This is because forced migration is 
less likely to satisfy the relevant conditions. Consider Necessity. Rich 
countries, unlike poor countries, have the resources to provide powerful 
financial incentives. This is how they retain their own skilled workers. If 
they used these resources to raise salaries and improve conditions in poor 
countries, sufficient numbers of workers could be retained without need 
for coercion. The conscription proposal seems unnecessary. When 
unnecessary, it is unjust.
Next consider Proportionality. Recall the distinction between the right 
to stay and the right to emigrate. The right to stay is typically much more 
important because it protects people’s abilities to access their attachments 
(life options already committed to) not just mere possibilities (as yet 
unchosen options). Because people’s strongest attachments, such as their 
friends, family, and community, tend to be situated within their home 
country, forcing people to leave is less likely to prove a proportionate 
response to brain drain than forcing people to remain.  For the same 
reason, foreign skilled workers are less likely to have a duty to migrate than 
citizen skilled workers are to have a duty to stay. People do not have duties 
to undergo particular hardship for the sake of those in need and separation 
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from one’s strongest attachments often involves such hardship.  
I have made the Proportionality point in previous work (Oberman 2013: 
438). In this book, Blake responds. He notes that rich country skilled 
workers would have the resources to enjoy a decent quality of life in poor 
countries. Many poor country skilled workers, by contrast, live in severe 
poverty. Separation from attachments is, in this way, balanced out by 
material advantage (Brock and Blake 2015: 133).
There is something true in this response but also something misleading. 
What is true is that emigration restrictions are difficult to justify when 
skilled workers themselves live in severe poverty. Severe poverty is one 
factor that can negate a Duty to Stay. What is misleading is the suggestion 
that among people who are not severely poor, those separated from 
attachments have no special complaint when they enjoy greater material 
advantages. People have basic interests in not being forcibly removed from 
their families, friends, and communities. People have no basic interests in 
the perks of an expat lifestyle. Governments cannot act then as if the one 
balances out the other. 
Since it is less likely that forced migration will satisfy the five conditions 
than emigration restrictions, Coercing Foreigners is a phantom condition. 
Emigration restrictions can be justified even when forced migration is not. 
7. THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM
In the contemporary world, few states impose emigration restrictions. 
Almost all states impose immigration restrictions. In section 1, we found 
that the same freedom is at stake in each case: the freedom of individuals 
to make basic decisions about their lives. It is surprising then that Brock 
has nothing to say regarding immigration restrictions and even more 
surprising that Blake defends them.
Compare the following:
1. Hasma lives in a poor country and wants to migrate abroad. She 
   possesses scarce skills. If she migrates, her compatriots will suffer  
   severe costs. To prevent these costs, Hasma’s state subjects her to  
    emigration restrictions for two years. Since it is poor, it is unable to  
    compensate her.
2. Nazma lives in a poor country and wants to migrate abroad. She  
   does not possess scarce skills. If she migrates, no one will suffer  
    in either host or home countries. Unfortunately, every state Nazma  
    wishes to migrate to subjects her to immigration restrictions for her  
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    entire life. Although they are rich, they refuse to compensate her.
Which of these two women has the stronger complaint? Surely Nazma. 
She is barred for life, without compensation, for no good reason. But on 
Blake’s account, it is Hasma who suffers injustice. How can this be? Blake 
offers two kinds of argument. In other work, he presents a justification for 
immigration restrictions (Blake 2013). In this book, he presents an 
alternative foundation of the right to emigrate. The former argument has 
already been subject to criticism (see for instance Brezger and Cassee 
2016); so let me here consider the latter.
According to Blake, the primary purpose of the right to emigrate is to 
uphold our interest in forming consensual relationships with states (Brock 
and Blake 2015: 198-199). Suppose Nazma is from India and wishes to go to 
Belgium to join friends and pursue her career. Once there, she would also 
like to make new friends, attend university, join a religious congregation, 
and find a partner. For Blake, Nazma has a right to leave India because she 
has an interest in forming a consensual relationship with Belgium. Since 
relationships are two-way things, Belgium is free not to enter into a 
relationship with her. It can spurn her if it wishes by imposing immigration 
restrictions. But as a third party, India has no right to stop a Nazma-
Belgium relationship from developing. This explains the immigration/
emigration asymmetry. The interest that grounds the right to emigrate is 
an interest in forming consensual relationships with states, and that 
interest is frustrated only by emigration restrictions not immigration 
restrictions (203).
How plausible is this as a foundational argument for the right to 
emigrate? Not very. It is strikingly at odds with the reasons why people 
migrate. People do not migrate to have relationships with states, but with 
the people who live in states. This is reflected in my account of the right to 
emigrate. Nazma has a right to emigrate, I would argue, so that she can 
have the consensual relationships with friends, employers, teachers, co-
worshippers, and partners she desires. She has an essential interest in 
having relationships with people in Belgium, not with Belgium itself. 
Someone who is passionate about forming new relationships with states is 
a bit of a crackpot. Someone who is passionate about enjoying relationships 
with other people is a typical human being.
Blake seeks to motivate his account by noting that migrants often feel 
emotional when undergoing naturalization. This emotion, he claims, 
indicates the strength of interest we have in forming relationships with 
states (Brock and Blake 2015: 199). What he fails to mention is that migrants 
are naturalized after years of living in a country. If some migrants are teary 
eyed at citizenship ceremonies, it is because they have made their new 
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state their home. This sense of belonging might ground a right to 
citizenship, but it cannot ground a right to emigrate. An interest in being 
recognized as a member of a state does not entail an interest in becoming 
a member.
Note further that if we really were worried about making our 
relationships with states consensual, the right to emigrate would be 
insufficient. Three points bring this out. (1) We are born into a state and 
would find it difficult to leave our state, due to financial, linguistic, and 
cultural ties, even if the borders were open. (2) Since states have taken over 
the earth’s surface, we cannot leave the state system altogether. (3) Because 
of (2), a person who is prevented from entering other states is prevented 
from leaving their own. Together, these points make states very different to 
clubs, religions, or marriages, in which consent is crucial. States, as John 
Rawls emphasizes, are not consensual associations (Rawls 1993: 222). This 
lack of consent does not particularly bother us as long as states treat us 
justly. Just states, after all, do not require us to have recreational, spiritual, 
or romantic relationships with them, but allow us to pursue our own.
The people of Planet Earth live inside states. When states prevent us 
from migrating, they interfere with our relationships. States have taken 
over the earth’s inhabitable land; the least they can do is allow us to freely 
interact.
8. EMPIRICAL UNCERTAINTIES
This article has specified five conditions for justifying emigration 
restrictions on brain drain grounds. Since I have rejected conditions that 
Brock and Blake defend, it might appear that I believe that emigration 
restrictions are easy to justify. But this is not so. We cannot assume that a set 
of conditions are easily fulfilled simply because they are fewer in number.
To judge whether the conditions are fulfilled requires an extensive 
examination of the empirical literature. I will not undertake this here. 
Having investigated the issue elsewhere,  however, I am confident of three 
points (Oberman 2015). First, many skilled workers in countries 
experiencing brain drain suffer particular hardship due to poverty, 
persecution, unsafe working conditions, or some other misfortune. Second, 
there are many things governments of poor countries could be doing to 
improve the lives of their citizens besides restricting emigration. These 
two points lend us reason to doubt the fulfillment of Necessity, 
Proportionality, and Duty to Stay.
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The third point is that there is significant empirical uncertainty as to 
the effects of skilled worker migration on poor countries. Skilled worker 
migration has a number of positive effects, including the receipt of 
remittances and the incentivizing of education, which might outweigh the 
negative. The fact of uncertainty here is important. Brock draws upon 
various sources to question the positive effects of skilled worker migration. 
But to justify the curtailment of a human right one must do more than 
show that some  journal articles suggest that there is a genuine problem. 
One must be able to find wide agreement among experts that skilled 
migration is causing severe costs.
Among migration economists there seems to be only one point of 
agreement: migration, as a general rule, benefits the global poor. There is 
no agreement as to when or where exceptions occur. Indeed, it is telling 
that some of empirical sources Brock uses to support her pessimistic view 
ill fit the role. For instance, while Brock makes frequent reference to a 
survey article by economists Frédéric Docquier and Hillel Rapoport, the 
article concludes that, “many developing countries appear to actually 
benefit from high-skill emigration”, that “skilled emigration need not 
deplete a country’s human capital stock”, and that the conditions for 
success “depend on [non-coercive] public policies” such as the creation of 
diaspora networks (Docquier and Rapoport 2012: 725). One can tell the 
extent of empirical uncertainties when witnesses called for the prosecution 
speak up for the defense.
What stands then in the way of justifying emigration restrictions is not 
a lack of government legitimacy, contractual agreements, compensation, 
fairness, benefits for the coerced party, or the need to justify the coercion 
of foreigners. It is something much more mundane. Counter-brain-drain 
emigration restrictions are hard to justify because the empirical data fails 
to provide a convincing case for them. While we can imagine a world in 
which emigration restrictions could be justified to prevent skilled 
migration, it is probably not our own.
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